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NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
that while the decision in Mahan140 could be accepted as a logical exten-
sion of Reynolds, the decision in Gaffney, because its effect could pos-
sibly result in the negation of population equality as the paramount goal
of reapportionment,14 1 is entirely inconsistent with prior opinions which
applied the requirement of equal protection to reapportionment.
IRWIN RUBIN
The Palestinian J*'g6%l People and Their
Political, Military and Legal Status in the World Community
... His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment
in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use
their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object,
it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may
prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish com-
munities in Palestine .... I
• . .This right ("of the Jewish people to national rebirth in its own
country") was recognised in the Balfour Declaration of the 2nd
November, 1917, and re-affirmed in the Mandate of the League
of Nations. We hereby affirm both, which, in particular, give inter-
national sanction to the historic connection between the Jewish
people and Eretz-Isreal and to the right of the Jewish people to
rebuild its National Home.2
... We do not consider the Arabs of the land an ethnic community
nor a people with a distinct national character. 3
The Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away. Praised be the name of
the Lord.4
During the long winter following the most recent Middle Eastern con-
flict many Westerners have asked poignant questions for the first time.
Reynolds and Abate). Population is controlling and these other factors are not justifiable where
there are substantially greater deviations. Id. at 934. But cf. Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S.
542, 553-556 (Justice White dissenting).
140 This takes for granted the fact that the rational test is applicable in state apportionment
cases. Of course, if the test is one of strict scrutiny, only the "absolute equality" principle
would be acceptable in all cases.
4 ' Since there is a fixed valid deviation, this leaves open the possibility whether or not
proof may be admitted that population was not the prime goal of the legislators.
Quoted from the text of the Balfour Declaration, appearing in STEIN, THE BALFOUR
DECLARATION (961 ).
2 ISRAEL, LAWS, STATUTES, ETC., Laws of the State of Israel (authorized trans.) (Tel
Aviv, 1948). This passage is of particular significance as it is quoted from Israel's Declara-
tion of Independence.
3 "An Open Letter to Y. Gaili," Arab World XV, no. 9 (1969) at 3.
4 JOB 1:21.
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Why have we an oil shortage? Who are the Arabs? What do Egypt, Syria
and Saudi Arabia want from us? Should the United States pressure Israel
to return the occupied territory in the Sinai and in Golan Heights to Egypt
and Syria respectively? But, what about Israel's security? How can we
implement a lasting peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors?
Depending on the various levels of consciousness of the person asking
the question, the spectra of questions raised above represents the thinking
of most individuals from the man on the street to Henry Kissinger at
the impending Geneva Peace Conference. Yet, regrettably, no one seems to
focus upon the rights, status or suffering of the Palestinian people, forcibly
living in exile, since the creation of the State of Israel, in more than a cursory
manner. The general thrust of these not infrequent examinations of the
Palestinian "problem" has often been framed in terms of a larger political
and legal struggle, Arabs v. Jews. So framed, any meaningful discussion
of the Palestinian people as a separate political entity having a legal status
of its own in international law and world affairs, has been totally submerged
in the larger legal and ideological conflicts of the other Middle Eastern
belligerents or, at best, treated merely as tangential to these larger con-
flicts.,
The thrust of this comment will be two-fold. First, it will examine the
reasoning behind the world community's refusal to recognize the Pales-
tinian people and/or its voice in exile, the Palestinian Liberation Organiza-
tion (P.L.O.), as political entities worthy of legal and political status within
the world community. This examination will necessarily entail not only
an analysis of Western attitudes on the subject but also an evaluation
of the attitudes of Israelis and the people of other Arab nations toward the
Palestinians and their tragic plight, as the latter have in some way con-
tributed to Western thought and policy-making. Moreover, the attitudes
of the Palestinians themselves and of their official organ, the P.L.O.,
must be made apparent so that One may understand their role in shaping
their own legal and political destiny in the international community. 6
The second object of this comment is to demonstrate that the Pales-
tinian people, through the P.L.O., already possess the status of a public
body in international law and have the legal right to carry on both political-
legal and military resistance against the State of Israel in accordance with
the U.N. Charter and the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1949.
This point is most significant in that it should dispel the commonly held
notion that the belligerent Arab states can speak or act in parens patriae
for the homeless "refugees" of Palestine.
See generally, The Middle East Crisis: Test of International Law, 33 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBLEMS no. i (1968).
6 In part a discussion of these attitudes will be based on personal encounters with Pales-
tinians and members of the P.L.O. both in the U.S. and during residence and frequent
visits to the Arab world. Reflections of my own encounters will be implemented by other
material to be cited infra.
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The people of Palestine through its representative, the P.L.O., must
be seated at Geneva or any other Middle Eastern peace conference and
must have an equal voice as a signatory to any treaties or resolutions ratified
by Israel and the Arab states, if a meaningful solution to Middle Eastern
belligerency is ever to be effectuated in a manner consistent with the
preservation of human rights and the fulfillment of concepts of justice
acceptable to the world community.
I. THE PALESTINIANS AS A POLITICAL ENTITY
A. A Brief History of Palestine
The area known as Palestine is bordered by the Mediterranean on
the east, the Jordan River on the west, the Golan Mountains and the Sea
of Galilee on the north, and the Negev and Sinai Deserts on the south.
The Palestinians are descendants of the biblical Abraham, Semites by
race, who have continuously inhabited that same area known as Palestine
for time immemorial. Since 1948, after the creation of the State of Israel
on that same territory, the inhabitants of that area are living in forced
exile.
Ever since 634, Semitic Arabs incorporated this region in the Islamic
nation after defeating the Roman occupiers, who in 70 A.D. had expelled
the Jews. Few Jews had remained on that land since the Diaspora, but
not all of the inhabitants were Jews and not all Jews left Palestine. When
the Arabs drove the Romans out of Palestine, they rescinded the decree
of banishment from Jerusalem, but few Jews returned until the nineteenth
century. 7
The territory and population of Palestine has always remained an
identifiable entity from either the Roman Empire, the Islamic nation, or
the Turkish Ottoman Empire. When the Turks were driven out of Palestine
during World War I by Arab and British forces, England, with the help
of the League of Nations, established a colonial regime in Palestine. The
mandate system, although a colonial device, spoke of "the provisionally
independent State of Palestine," thus further underscoring the identifiable
character of the territory and its inhabitants. The mandate system was
predicated on the existence of a Palestinian entity which was to acquire
complete independence. 8 The administration of Palestine under the mandate
reinforced that fact through the establishment of legislative, executive and
judicial bodies. Palestine had a flag. Its nationals carried passports recog-
nized abroad. In effect, with the exception of carrying on its own foreign
affairs and of being subject to internal limitations imposed by England
similar to Egypt or India, Palestine was seised of all the indicia of a national
state. Yet, subsequent to the events leading to the proclamation of the
I THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ISLAM, (eds. Holt, Lambton & Lewis) (1970).
8 Id.
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State of Israel in 1947-1948, the Palestinians ceased to be a "people"
and became "refugees" and Palestine ceased to exist as an identifiable
region.
B. Contemporary Palestinian Politics
One of the most interesting developments to come out of the 1967
War, the frequent commando raids by the Palestinian resistance from 1968
to 1972, and the 1973 conflict in the Middle East is the increasing awareness
on the part of Westerners as well as Middle Easterners that the Palestinians
are a distinct political community.
For nearly twenty years the Western world has viewed the Palestinians
in "charitable" and "humane" terms as refugees, 9 a people whose lament-
able destiny was the product of irreconcilable regional and world forces.
From time to time, visual and touching accounts have been given of the
miserable conditions of their existence in refugee camps, thus spurring
well-meaning individuals and organizations to increase or supplement
the amount of aid that had been given to them.10 If any questions were
raised, they went to only technical matters such as whether the Palestinians
were evicted from their homeland or whether they left of their own voli-
tion; whether UNRWA figures regarding the number of refugees were in
fact accurate; whether the seven cents-worth of daily rations per refugee
was too much or too little; whether the United States and other Western
powers should increase or diminish their voluntary contributions; how
many Palestinians could be realistically repatriated to Israel in the event
of a political solution; and how could the remainder of the Palestinians
be resettled in the Arab countries with or without international assistance.
In short, the Palestinians were regarded as a tragic people whose suffering
could be alleviated if "common human decency" and genuine "goodwill" on
the part of all were to prevail.
In the Middle East itself, the view of the Palestinian has been some-
what more complex. The Israelis have seen the Palestinians as an
unfortunate and underdeveloped people whose sordid life could have
been ameliorated long ago were it not for the cynical leadership in the
neighboring Arab states." Even those Israelis who have felt some pangs
" See G.A. RES. 194 (1948) which while granting the "refugees" a right to return to their
former homeland and to compensation for lost property, never admitted to the reality that
these "refugees" constitute a "people." See also S.C. RES. 242 (1967) as a continued
misunderstanding of the nature of the Palestinian problem. The resolution referring to the
Palestinians stated as follows:
2. affirms the necessity ...
(b) for achieving a just
settlement of the refugee
problem . . .(emphasis added)
10 A. BOBER, THE OTHER ISRAEL-THE RADICAL CASE AGAINST ZIONISM (1972).
11 U. AVENARY, ISRAEL WITHOUT ZIONISM (1968), at 129.
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of guilt in this human tragedy often assuaged their conscience by arguing
that these refugees were the problem of their kinfolk; that the Palestinians
left their homes of their own accord and with the prodding of radio broad-
casts from neighboring Arab capitals; and that except for a relatively
small number, Israel could not allow all the Palestinian refugees who so
wished to return to their homeland without jeopardizing the Jewish State's
security and upsetting its ethnic composition, thereby calling into question
its very raison d'etre. Moreover, many Israelis have felt that Israel has
absorbed a vast number of Jewish immigrants from Arab nations; and since
Israel had settled those Jewish immigrants, it was only fair and proper that
the Arab states should settle the Palestinian Arabs in their midst.
In the Arab world, there has not been a single or uniform attitude that
is all pervasive toward the Palestinians. Instead, there were, and perhaps
still are, a number of attitudes depending on the ideological orientation
and socio-economic status of the Arab observer, despite all that has tran-
spired since the 1967 War, the military activities of the Palestinian Resis-
tance, and the volatile cease-fire following the most recent hostilities be-
tween Israel, Syria and Egypt.
To the Arab nationalist, the Palestinians are the first and fore-
most uncomfortable reminder of what he keenly feels to be the worst
calamity to befall the Arab nations in modern times. The nationalist's
sense of personal involvement in the lot of the Palestinians has
not stemmed from his humanitarian impulses or from his sense of
compassion, but from his political consciousness and his nationalistic
perceptions and aspirations. This should not be taken to imply that such
a person is callous or insensitive to the plight of the Palestinians, but
merely to state that his feeling of outrage has been more directed at the
origins and political consequences of the Palestine problem than the result
of his revulsion of the nature of the Palestinian people's existence in refugee
settlements. In fact, it is doubtful that many ardent nationalists have been
fully acquainted with the conditions of life in the refugee camps; and
even if they are so acquainted, it is quite possible that their sense of
empathy has been blunted by their familiarity with not too dissimilar
standards of living prevelant amongst their own compatriots. Never-
theless, it is the nationalist's feeling of shame that the Arabs have been
unable to stem the forces of Zionism that wounds him; it is his sense
of soiled honor that grieves him; it is his frustration at having been unable
to erase a grave political injustice that constantly gnaws at him. Sub-
sequently, the Palestinians are a living spectre constantly recalling these
distressingly uncomfortable multitudes of passion. And the intensity of
these aroused emotions is so overwhelming that it generates as a defense
mechanism a disposition to lash out at the Palestinians themselves and to
accuse them of having been the cause of the current Arab Predicament. ' 2
12 Such conclusions have been drawn from my encounters with zealous Arab nationalists,
principally in Cairo, Beirut, and Damascus.
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There are, however, those Arabs whose ideological commitment to
the cause of Arab nationalism is less complete, and to whom Palestinians
have not been as much a source of deep anguish as they have been a stum-
bling block in the pursuit of personal aspirations. It is these individuals
who, while sharing in the all-pervasive yet somewhat vague yearning for
Arab unity, and while capable of emotional involvement, in times of height-
ened Arab-Israeli tensions, are nonetheless more intimately concerned
with the attainment of personal goals and the satisfaction of material de-
sires. On a day-to-day basis, it is not the refugees in the camps that con-
cern them, but the educated, skilled, urbanized, and entrepreneurial
Palestinians who have established themselves in all sectors of the neigh-
boring Arab societies, and who have gradually come to be perceived as
competitors in the marketplace, schools, and in certain corridors of
political power. Ordinary feelings of resentment, jealousy, envy and hos-
tility, common to all such situations, where real or imaginary fears of dis-
placement have given rise to class or group tensions, are further ag-
gravated by those Palestinians who have (1) continued to maintain their
separate national identity despite the acquisition of the legal benefits of
provisional citizenship from the host countries; (2) assumed a posture
of superiority through derogatory references to the governmental, ad-
ministrative, and organizational machinery of the Arab states and through
constant reminiscences about how things were done in Palestine; and (3)
chided other Arabs for their lack of preparation and weak resolve in their
confrontations with Israel. Understandably enough, these factors
have hardly served to endear the Palestinians, who in the eyes of many
Arab neighbors have come to be looked upon as a "plague" in their
midst. 1 3
It would be presumptuous and inaccurate to suppose that the above
classifications exhaust all the feelings and attitudes regarding the Pales-
tinians that are current throughout the world. There are probably as many
reactions to the Palestinians as there are individuals. However, what is
common to all these views is that none of them sees the Palestinians as
a corporate political entity, possessed of preferences and aspirations, and
having an independent will of its own that is sufficiently crystallized as to
have merited consideration in the determination of affairs in the region
during the past twenty years. On the contrary, the underlying supposition
that is frequently manifested in the discourse of individuals at all levels
of public accountability, Arab, Israeli, or Westerner, is that the Palestinians
are a malleable group that can be politically distended or constricted to
conform to the shape of any political agreement that may ultimately emerge.
They are essentially regarded as a problem, an impediment or a cancer,
whose solution, removal or excision must be accomplished in order that
" PALESTINE-THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, (ed. R. Stetler) (1972).
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the larger and more significant goal of peace may be reached. Just exactly
how this task is to proceed, or what will become of the Palestinians has
never been clearly spelled out. Instead, vague generalities are given. An
example is the November 1967 resolution of the U.N. Security Council
which calls for a "just settlement of the refugee problem."' 14 Some world
leaders have spoken of an "honorable" solution. Others talk of "fair"
compensation. Some discuss "minimum" repatriation, while still others
advocate "resettlement." Aside from the simple fact that no one seems
to know exactly what is meant by "just," "honorable," or "fair," or
how many would be repatriated, or where the remainder would be "re-
settled" there is an implicit assumption that the Palestinians will meekly
accept, and comply with, whatever scheme that may be worked out by
others. Indeed, one suspects that there exists a commonly held notion
that the Palestinians are regarded as morally obligated to submit to any
solution that may be devised by the international community no matter
how repugnant or unpalatable they may deem it.
Most important, however, in obtaining a thorough understanding of
contemporary Palestinian politics is the query: How has the Palestinian
Arab community, once an active political body, reacted to the suggestions
of the world community that they are an amorphous entity whose character
can be molded to suit the predilections of others? The answer to this
question may be found in an analysis of the tragic events commencing with
the creation of the State of Israel and remaining unterminated as of the
present date.
The consequences of the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli conflict are clear. Aside
from the fact that the majority of Palestinian Arabs found themselves
suddenly as refugees, with all the humane, legal, economic, social, and
psychological liabilities that this naked status entailed, politically speaking
they had become a bludgeoned group. They were scattered throughout
the neighboring Arab states, denied the requisite of freedom of movement
across state boundaries, their leadership discredited and defunct. What-
ever rudiments of organization they had possessed in Palestine was now
tattered and irrelevant. Furthermore, the immediate issue before them was
no longer the fundamental question of the future of Palestine, but of their
right to return to their homes, lands, and possessions, and to escape the
deprivations and indignities which their newly acquired refugee status
often brought.
Efforts to revive old political networks through the establishment
of a government in exile met with little enthusiasm on the part of the
younger westernized Palestinian intelligentsia, who were often con-
temptuous of the policies and personalities of the past and who could
no longer be intimidated into silence as they once were. In addition, the cre-
14 S.C. REs. 242 (1967).
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ation of a vigorous and vociferous Palestinian movement would not have
met with universal approval from every Arab quarter. Thus, the Palestinians,
lacking adequate organization, inexperienced in the channels of twentieth
century diplomacy, wanting in the necessary apparatus with which to wage a
diplomatic offensive, unskilled in the techniques of propaganda, and devoid
of the unequivocal support of a major world power or the advocacy of a pow-
erful constituency therein, 15 were in no position to mount an effective cam-
paign in international forums.
It would have seemed natural in such circumstances for the Arab states
to step forward and fill this diplomatic void of the Palestinian people.
The Arab states were independent political units, recognized by the inter-
national community, possessed of all the indicia of sovereignty, and having
representation in world capitals as well as in the United Nations. Their
reach and influence extended into circles to which the displaced, disor-
ganized mass of Palestinians had no access.
However, this step forward by the Arab states met with an impasse. The
Arab states, in the aftermath of the 1948-49 defeat, became steeped in
a tumultuous soul-searching process which unleashed a period of severe
political instability and which gave added impetus to a long-held desire
to adjust the pattern of relationships with the major world powers that
derived from a colonial past. The general concensus of the Arab states
was that the "Palestinian question" could not be tackled until internal
political and economic stability were accomplished, goals that were deemed
attainable only after the shackles of the colonial era had been entirely
removed. Subsequently, for the next few years the Palestinians had to
take a back seat to such matters as the Egyptian revolution of 1952,
agrarian reform, withdrawal of British troops from the Suez, future military
ties with the West, the Baghdad Pact and construction of the Aswan Dam.
The 1956 Suez Crisis, rather than refocusing attention on the Pales-
tinians, served only to divert attention from them. The conflict over Pales-
tine, once a localized dispute, had now assumed global proportions. In
addition to dragging in England and France, it now brought the ominous
prospect of the United States and Russian involvement. The issues posed
transcended those of the region; the peace of the world was deemed at
stake. The likelihood of nuclear warfare, in an ever-shrinking world in
which local and regional conflicts could no longer be neatly separated
from total world disorder, had rapidly impinged on the consciousness of
human beings worldwide.
However, even when the spectre of nuclear disaster had faded, the
Palestinians did not come into view. The international community was
too concerned with the immediacy of the issues attending Suez to pay them
any heed. Instead, the resources of the U.N. and the imaginations of
" A good example would be the Jewish vote and influence in the United States.
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its statesmen were devoted to such matters as the future of the Suez Canal,
the effectuation of Israeli, British, and French withdrawal of forces from
Egypt, the creation and deployment of a U.N. Emergency Force, de-
militarization, Sharm El Sheikh, the Straits of Tiran, international ship-
ping, and the Gulf of Aqaba. Ironically enough, the more complex and
magnified the Palestinian question became, the less visible were the
Palestinians.
The events surrounding the Six Day War in 1967 hardly served to
change the picture. Apart from the bevy of humanitarian resolutions call-
ing upon Israel to allow the Palestinians to return to their homes (resolu-
tions similar to the many that had been passed over the last twenty years
by various organs of the U.N.), the plight of the Palestinian people did not
activate great concern. If anything, it was further submerged. Though the
November 1967 Security Council resolution "affirmed ... the necessity
... for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem," 16 the bulk
of that resolution was directed at such questions as the termination of
belligerency, withdrawal of Israeli forces, acknowledgement of sover-
eignty, boundaries, territorial inviolability, navigation through international
waters, inadmissibility of territorial annexation by conquest and demili-
tarization.
However, though they may have been drowned out in the U.N., in
the Middle East itself the Palestinians were gaining recognition. In the after-
math of the shattering defeat of the Arab armies in the Six Day War,
many elements converged to bring them into prominence.
It became obvious to nearly everyone that the traditional methods
employed by the Arab states in dealing with Israel had proven to be a
failure. It was also clear that the highly vocal Arab leadership which had
been so shrill prior to the 1967 War had now been tarnished. It became
further evident that the remnants of the old Palestinian leadership, sym-
bolized by Ahmed Shukairy, was subservient to the will of the Arab League
and some of the members of the League could no longer claim the allegiance
of the Palestinians. Out of this morass of defeat, came the voices of hitherto
silent and not-too-prominent younger Palestinians such as George Habash,
present leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
and Yasir Arafat, current head of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.
These young Palestinians were much more performance oriented than
their predecessors, far less given to pompous pronouncements, better
adept at organizational skills, and far more possessed of a sense of political
realism.
An examination of the history of the past two decades no doubt finally
convinced these young Palestinians of the futility of their dependence
on the Arab states. They clearly saw that instead of saving Palestine for the
16 Supra, note 14.
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Palestinians, the Arab states only succeeded in surrendering more of
the territory to Israel after each attempt. Furthermore, some of the Arab
states were now so anxious to preserve their own territorial integrity that
in exchange for Israeli troop withdrawals they were about to concede
the loss of Palestine through the recognition of Israel and the ending of
all belligerent claims.
The general feeling among this younger generation of Palestinians
has been and continues to be that the road returning to Palestine can only
be paved by the Palestinians themselves. They have drawn inspiration
from the activities of the Algerians, Cubans, Tupamaros, and Vietnamese,
and many of them are well-versed in the literature of guerilla warfare and
national liberation. Some of the Palestinians have established contacts
with these groups and have received valuable training from them.
After the 1967 War, the principal Palestinian resistance groups, the
P.L.O. and P.F.L.P., under the supervision of their leaders, Yasir Arafat
and George Habash, mounted attacks in Israel and in the occupied ter-
ritory through their military arm, Al Fateh. These attacks were seized upon
by the Arab people and their governments as a sign that the struggle with
Israel had not yet ended and the war itself was far from over. Subsequently,
contributions came pouring in from all corners of the Arab world, Egypt,
Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya. Money, supplies, and weapons were
sent. And in the publicity given the Israeli raid on the Palestinian resistance
camp in Karameh, Jordan, recruits were easily obtained. The resistance
movement captured the imagination of not only the Palestinians in the
refugee camps but also university students, doctors, lawyers, engineers
and other professionals. Almost overnight what was only an incipient
resistance movement turned into a well structured and intricately woven
organization.
The object of the resistance movement is quite simple: the return of
the Palestinians to their homes in a Palestine or an Israel that would be
be de-Zionized. That is, Palestine would revert to its old self when it con-
sisted of two communities working in harmony side by side under a, politi-
cal arrangement whereby Judaism would not bestow any special privileges.
Toward that goal the members of the Palestinian resistance, fedayin (self-
sacrificers), are willing to risk anything including the ever-increasing
likelihood of escalation and total conflict. Their frequent operations in
the area of hijacking, commando raids into Israel, and foreign assassi-
nations over the past five years do well to emphasize their lofty commit-
ment. 1 7 It is the stance of the Palestinian resistance fighters and the policy of
principal voice, the P.L.O., that they will neither allow the Arab gov-
ernments to assume control over them, or to restrict their commando
"7 See F. Jabber, The Palestinian Resistance and Inter-Arab Politics, (RAND Corp.
pamphlet) (1971) for a documented account of commando raids and guerilla operations within
Israel. See also PALESTINE-THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 13.
10
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activities. This is evidenced by the fedayin clashes with the Jordanian
and Lebanese armies over the past three years.18
However, there is a tendency in certain quarters, particularly in Israel,
to play down the military effectiveness of the fedayin. The argument that
has been presented in the Western press is that the Palestinian resistance
is obviously no match for the Israeli Army. They are merely a small thorn
in its side. And that in the final analysis they fall into the category of a
nuisance which cannot, in all reality, pose a serious threat to the survival
of the Jewish State. 19
However, such a view would appear to be quite myopic. For Israel,
the continual resort to military measures cannot help but prove corrosive.
An alleged democratic society cannot maintain its professed character
with repression in its midst. The impact of emergency laws enacted, of
violence and counter violence, and of the deep hatreds that have been
engendered would most certainly shake the foundations of any society. Re-
liance on force would become automatic and the continued suspension of
civil liberties would be constitutionally debilitating. It seems that the
greatest threat to Israel is the one rising from within itself as a result of
its increasing dependence on military force. No society espousing demo-
cratic principles can ultimately maintain its values and at the same time
be a praetorian state.
Israel must realize that the Palestinians are not only a living reality
but also a corporate political entity if peace is ever to be achieved. It does
not do Israel, the neighboring Arab states, the West, or the world com-
munity any service to pretend that the Palestinians never existed. Unlike
what many Zionists would have the world believe, Palestine was neither
a land without a people to be earmarked for a people without a land nor
was it a desert which the Israelis made bloom in a span of twenty-five
years. Palestinians lived there for centuries. They worked their fields,
planted their crops, ran their small industries and tended their commerce.
They were not as technologically advanced as the European Zionists
who came to settle in their midst, but that does not mean that the Pales-
tinians are second class human beings who can be continuously expelled
to give way to Israeli settlement and security problems. Nor does it mean
that they can be herded into a corner of the West Bank, integrated econom-
ically but deprived of citizenship rights. Such notions are untenable not
only to the P.L.O. but also to the Palestinian people individually,20 who
are not quite willing to concede that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights is inapplicable to them. 2'
" Jabber, supra note 17, describes the incredible frequency of fedayin clashes with the
regular armies of Jordan and Lebanon.
"'Y. Harkabi, Fedayin Action and Arab Strategy, Adelphi Papers, no. 53 (London
Institute for Strategic Studies) (Dec. 1969).
20 See PALESTINE-THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 13.
21 See "THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS," approved by the G.A.
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II. THE STATUS OF THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The function of international law is thought of as providing the basic
legal principles, founded upon justice, by which peoples and individuals
may achieve their human rights. This function is unequivocally expressed
in the U.N. Charter which is the fundamental law or constitution of the
world community. Its supremacy is so important that article 103 of the
Charter specifically provides that:
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members
of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obliga-
tions under any other international agreement, their obligations
under the present Charter shall prevail.
The Preamble of the United Nations Charter also gives unequivocal
support for the conception of international law which is advocated here.
It states:
We the Peoples of the United Nations (are) determined to save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in
our lifetime has brough untold sorrow to mankind, and
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth
of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and
of nations small and large, and to establish conditions under which
justice and respect for obligations arising from treaties and other
sources of international law can be maintained, and
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger
freedom.
Among the basic purposes of the Charter which are set forth in article
I. are the following:
To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and
to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
To achieve international cooperation in solving international prob-
lems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character,
and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion....
It is clear that the Palestinian people have not received their basic
human rights without distinction upon the basis of religion or their rights
of the U.N. on Dec. 10, 1948. Art. 13 provides that:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of
movement and residence within the
borders of each State.
2. Everyone has the right to leave
any country, including his own,
and return to his country.
12
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 [1974], Art. 14
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol5/iss2/14
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
as a people, including the right to self-determination. On the contrary,
the Palestinians, along with several African peoples, have been system-
atically deprived of these rights. These peoples have been repeatedly
subjected to "the scourge of war" and intense and continual coercion
which, although illegal, are very real.
This situation has obviously led to a deep distrust of international law
by many Palestinians and their leaders. From their viewpoint international
law is no more than a facade behind which the large powers and their
military and political proteges among the smaller powers may implement
decisions based on military force without regard to the basic human rights
of other peoples.
It is, therefore, essential to add the requirements of adequate enforce-
ment and sanctions to any conception of international law to make it prac-
tical and meaningful. International law is no more self-enforcing than
are the traffic laws in Berkeley, Beirut, or Cairo. To provide effective
enforcement it is necessary to improve existing sanctions and to create
new ones rather than merely to deplore the present inadequate enforcement
situation. Enforcement must be viewed as a comprehensive sanctioning
process rather than as a group of spasmodic and uncoordinated enforcement
efforts.
A. The Legal Status of the Palestinian Military Resistance
Among the aspects of a resistance movement which are affected by
international law is the military aspect. Therefore, it is necessary to eval-
uate the legal status of the Palestinian military resistance, both organized
(Al Fateh) and unorganized (Black September), under the criteria of the
international law of war.
1. ORGANIZED RESISTANCE
A lawful resistance movement must be comprised of individuals who
are privileged combatants under the international law of war. According
to that law, a privileged combatant is one who is entitled to the benefits
and protection of prisoner of war (P.O.W.) status if captured. Thus,
attention should be directed to that segment of international law which
identifies these individuals. The applicable international agreement is the
Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1949,22 to which all of the states
which have participated in the recurring Arab-Israeli hostilities are
parties. The P.O.W. Convention provides that it "shall apply to all cases
of declared war or of any other armed conflict" which may arise, "even
if the state of war is not recognized by one" of the parties to the Conven-
tion. It is clear that the Convention applies to armed forces involved in
22 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364.
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the Arab-Israeli hostilities whether these hostilities are regarded as "war"
or merely "armed conflict." And, it is an established principle of inter-
national law that a cease-fire or armistice does not terminate a war or
conflict. 23
Article 4A(2) of the P.O.W. Convention, after specifying that members
of regular armed forces are privileged combatants and are therefore en-
titled to P.O.W. status if captured, deals with the status of "organized
resistance movements." It provides that the following persons are also
privileged combatants, entitled to P.O.W. status if captured:
Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps,
including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a
party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory,
even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or
volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements,
fulfil the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war. 24
The requirement of "belonging to a party to the conflict" does not
mean the subordination of the resistance movement to a state which is
a party to the conflict or the dependence of such a movement upon that
state. The official commentary of the International Committee of the
Red Cross on this provision of the P.O.W. Convention emphasizes that
an informal relationship between the resistance movement and the state
party to the conflict is sufficient. The commentary provides:
It (the requirement) may find expression merely by tacit agreement
if the operations are such as to indicate clearly for which side the
resistance organization is fighting. 25
Thus, it is clear from this article of the Convention that there was no
intention to impose a higher standard on guerilla or resistance forces than
that applied to regular armed forces. The requirements set forth as (a)
through (d) above are designed to apply to guerilla fighters the same basic
criteria which are applicable to regular armed forces. The organized char-
acter of the commando units of Al Fateh, the military arm of the P.L.O.
and P.F.L.P., including the fact they are "commanded by a person respon-
sible for his subordinates," is well known. The contemporary uniforms
23 2 OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: DISPUTES, WAR AND NEU-
TRALITY (7th ed. 1952) at 546-47.
24 Emphasis is added to the quotation.
25 INT'L COMM'N OF THE RED CROSS, 3 Commentary on the P.O.W. Convention
57 (1960).
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of regular armed forces are designed to provide effective camouflage, and
guerillas may wear a similar uniform with a "fixed distinctive sign" which
may, in the case of the fedayin, consist of a particular type of headgear
or cap, their black and white checked scarf. In the same manner, guerilla
forces may carry weapons such as automatic pistols and hand grenades
attached to belts under coats and comply with the requirement of "carrying
arms openly." With respect to the requirement concerning complicity
with "the laws and customs of war," guerillas have the same obligations
as regular armed forces.
The most significant feature of Article 4 is that "organized resistance
movements" are given a legal right to conduct their guerilla activities even if
their own territory is occupied by the enemy. Such organized forces are en-
titled as a matter of law to conduct operations "in or outside their own terri-
tory" without regard to the question of whether or not the military occupant
is adhering to the international law of war, including the Geneva Civilians
Convention of 1949.26 This absolute right to military resistance stands
in contrast to earlier international law which undertook to prohibit re-
sistance movements by postulating a "duty of allegiance" owed by the
inhabitants of occupied territories to the military occupants. The experi-
ences of World War II were undoubtedly taken into account in the writing
of the P.O.W. Convention and of the Civilians Convention. Such ex-
periences no doubt indicated that it was impossible to separate resistance
forces from civilian population. Article 68 of the Civilians Convention
also emphasizes this change by stating flatly that a civilian protected per-
son in the occupied territory "is not a national of the occupying power"
and "is not bound to it by any duty of allegiance." Since civilians who are
not participating in the resistance have no duty of allegiance to the military
occupant, it is clear, by implication, that organized guerilla forces who
comprise the military resistance have no such duty to the occupying power
without regard to whether or not the occupant adheres to its obligations
under the Civilians Convention.
Thus, the P.O.W. Convention gives to the organized military resistance
forces of the P.L.O./P.F.L.P., Al Fateh, the same status as privileged
combatants under international law which it accords to the regular
armed forces of any nation.
2. UNORGANIZED RESISTANCE
Article 4A(2) of the P.O.W. Convention does not specifically deal
with the legal status of unorganized resistance forces. The Report of
Committee II at the Geneva Diplomatic Conference of 1949 made it clear,
however, that participating nations at that Conference did not, in specifi-
cally according P.O.W. status to captured members of organized resistance
26 75 U.N.T.S. 237, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365.
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movements, attempt to restrict or deny basic international legal protections
to unorganized guerilla-type resistance undertaken by inhabitants of
occupied territories against an occupant's violations of international legal
limitations on its authority. The report states that the Danish Delegation
asked that the Summary Record should mention that no objection
had been raised, during the discussion in the Special Committee,
against his view that Article (4) (of the P.O.W. Convention) could
not be interpreted in such a way as to deprive persons not covered
by the provisions of Article (4) of their human rights or of their
right of self-defence against illegal acts....
The outcome of this interpretation of the work of the 1949 Conference
which adopted the P.O.W. Convention is that unorganized resistance
may be lawfully conducted by the civilian population providing that the
military occupant commits "illegal acts" in violation of the Geneva Civil-
ians Convention of 1949. These unorganized resistance fighters must be
accorded status as privileged combatants even if they do not meet all of
the requirements which are specified for organized resistance forces in
article 4 of the P.O.W. Convention.
Thus, the legality of the acts of unorganized resistance forces is de-
pendent on the occupying power's failure to act in accordance with in-
ternational law. The principal law on this subject is contained in the
Geneva Civilians Convention. This Convention was written in the shadow
of World War II when an overwhelming majority of states in the world
community were determined to prevent a repetition of the terrible acts
carried out under the Nazi occupations in Europe and the Japanese
occupations in Asia. The State of Israel and all of the Arab states in-
volved in the recurring hostilities are parties to the Geneva Civilians
Convention and there is no question that it is applicable, at least in
territories occupied by Israel since 1967. Even the United States Gov-
ernment has taken the position that the Civilians Convention applies
to and limits the Government of Israel. Ambassador Yost stated this
in the U.N. Security Council on July 1, 1969 and added that the U.S.
Government has "so informed the Government of Israel on numerous
occasions since July, 1967."27 Since international law is not self-enforcing,
it is most regrettable that the U.S. Government did not follow its words
with actions designed to implement them.
For an appraisal of the Israeli government's role in the more recently
occupied territories since the 1967 hostilities, several reports of U.N.
investigations (made without Israel's cooperation) and the resolutions of
various organs of the U.N. are available. 2 8 A recent example is the U.N.
27 61 U.S. STATE DEP'T. BULL. 76, 77 (July 28, 1969).
28 These resolutions, from 1967-1971, are collected in Palestine: Concordance of United
Nations Resolutions 1967-1971, (eds. F. Sayegh & S. Soukkary) (1971).
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Human Rights Commission resolution of March 23, 1972.21 It states in
part that the Human Rights Commission is:
Gravely concerned with all acts and policies that affect the status
or the character of those occupied territories and the basic rights
of the inhabitants there of, such as:
(a) The declared intention to annex certain parts of the occupied
Arab territories,
(b) The establishment of Israeli settlements on those territories
and the transfer of parts of its civilian population into the oc-
cupied territories,
(c) The evacuation, transfer, deportation and expulsion of the in-
habitants of occupied territories,
(d) The destruction and demolition of villages, quarters and houses
and the confiscation and expropriation of property,
(e) The denial of the right of the refugees and displaced persons to
return to their homes,
(f) Collective punishment and ill-treatment of prisoners and de-
tainees,
(g) Administrative detention and holding prisoners incommunicado
Each of the above quoted portions of the Commission's resolution
deals with an express violation of one or more provisions of the Geneva
Civilians Convention of 1949. It follows that in view of the illegal character
of the Israeli military occupation, there is ample authority in international
law for Palestinian resistance groups such as Black September to conduct
unorganized military resistance. This legal authority is further strengthened
by the U.N. General Assembly Resolution of December 6, 197 1,3 which
recognizes the legality of the fight for basic rights of the Palestinian people
and of specified African peoples.
B. The Status of the Political-Legal Resistance of the Palestinian
People
In appraising both military and political-legal resistance, it must be
recognized that there are many close relationships between the two and
that it would be inaccurate to attempt to draw a rigid distinction between
them. But it is difficult to see how military resistance can be a significant
factor unless it is connected with a viable entity and an accompanying
political institution. Thus, if legal status can be obtained for the entity
and the institution, the entire resistance is strengthened.
1. THE SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: PUBLIC BODIES
Subjects of international law are no longer limited to national states.
Among the subjects of international law, international public bodies or
29 U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N. 28th Sess., ll61st Meeting; U.N. Press Release
HR/812 (1972).
30 See text accompanying note 40 infra.
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organizations are of particular importance. One definition of a public
body is that it is a non-territorial government. Although particular public
bodies may be governments in exile, this is not a necessary characteristic
of public bodies as a group. In general, the group is comprised of entities
established for public purposes which, like states, are subjects of inter-
national law. A memorandum of the Secretary-General of the U.N. has
described the current situation as follows:
Practice has abandoned the doctrine that States are the exclusive
subjects of international rights and duties.31
Public bodies are usually created as subjects of international law through
the explicit multilateral agreement of states, that is, through implication
drawn from an appraisal of their substantive powers. The U.N., despite
its pre-eminent position as the principal general-function public body, is
not explicitly constituted as a public body by its Charter. However, the
International Court of Justice in the United Nations Reparations Case32
determined that the U.N. has legal status as a subject of international
law by necessary implication from the sustantive powers granted to it by
the Charter. The Court found the U.N. to be a "subject of international
law and (a public body) capable of possessing international rights and
duties . . .,, The present significance of this case is that it illustrates
the empirical analysis which must be made in an inquiry concerning the
assignment of status as a public body-subject of international law. Pro-
fessor Hersh Lauterpacht has provided these criteria
In each particular case the question whether a person or body is
a subject of international law must be answered in a pragmatic
manner by reference to actual experience and to the reason of the
law as distinguished from a preconceived notion as to who can be
subjects of international law.3 4
These criteria must now be employed in determining the public body status
of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.
2. THE P.L.O. AS A PUBLIC BODY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Palestinian leaders have recognized that even the most elementary
and well established human and political rights are not self-fulfilling and
that there is a practical need for a public institution to achieve such rights.
The Palestinian Liberation Organization was established in 1964 with the
assistance of other Arab groups and through the authority of the League
of Arab states as a public body to represent and act for the people of
Palestine. 35 The League of Arab States has recognized the P.L.O.'s public
31 Memo. of Sec. Gen. U.N. Survey of Int'l Law in Relation to the Work of Codification
of the Int'l Law Comm'n., A/cn. 4/I/Rev.l, p. 1 9 (Feb. 10, 1949).
32 (1949) I.C.J. 174.
33 Id. at 177.
34 INT'L LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 12 (1950).
31 THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COVENANT (1964).
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and representative capacities from its establishment to the present. The
overwhelming majority of individual Arab states recognize it in the same
capacities as it maintains offices in a number of these states. These offices
and the Palestinian officials who serve in them are accorded diplomatic
status and privileges.
Some states outside the Arab world also recognize the public body
status and the representative capacity of the P.L.O. It is particularly im-
portant that one of the great powers and a permanent member of the U.N.
Security Council, the People's Republic of China, is one of these states,
and it has extended recognition to the P.L.O. since 1965.
The U.N. has accorded unofficial observer status to the P.L.O., and
its delegation in New York City works with the delegations of other states
in seeking Palestinian objectives. The most important objectives are to
achieve, first the recognition and then the implementation of the rights
of the Palestinians and of other oppressed peoples. By working with states
and other peoples for common goals, the P.L.O. has demonstrated the
universal characteristics of its own goals. Through the P.L.O., the Pales-
tinian people have an institution of their own to speak and act for them in
national and international affairs. The character of the P.L.O. as a public
body provides the indispensable legal status to achieve the political and
legal objectives of the Palestinian people.
3. RECOGNITION OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE
BY THE UNITED NATIONS
Until 1969, the U.N. referred to the Palestinians as "refugees" and
dealt with them in that capacity. Factually, there is no doubt that many
Palestinians have been refugees since the establishment of the State of
Israel as a Zionist state. Nevertheless, the Palestinians have insisted upon
the maintenance of their status as a "people." On December 10, 1969,
in a resolution that was adopted by more than the two-thirds majority
required by the charter for important questions, the General Assembly
of the U.N. stated that
Recognizing that the problem of the Palestine Arab refugees has
arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights under the Charter
of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, (the General Assembly of the United Nations is)
Gravely concerned that the denial of their rights has been aggravated
by the reported acts of collective punishment, arbitrary detention,
curfews, destruction of homes and property, deportation and other
repressive acts against the refugees and other inhabitants of the
occupied territories, (and it)
Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine. 36
36 G.A. RES. 2535 B (1969).
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Thus, the General Assembly of the U.N. has recognized that the Pales-
tinians are a people under international law and that they are entitled to
the same inalienable rights as other peoples.
Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter require all member states to
promote and to take action to achieve
... universal -respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language or religion.
The individuals comprising the people of Palestine are Palestinians of
Moslem, Christian or Jewish identification consistent with the quoted
non-discriminatory requirements of the U.N. Charter as well as with the
Palestinian objectives of democracy and secularism. 37 The Palestinian
people, as recognized by the U.N. General Assembly, comprise a distinct
national entity which, at the present time, exists without a national state.
This recognition of the Palestinian people as a national entity provides
a firm legal foundation upon which the Palestinian people under the leader-
ship of the P.L.O. can effectuate the same rights which have been achieved
by other peoples under the U.N. Charter. This recognition of the Pales-
tinians as a people is equally important as the establishment of the P.L.O.
as a public body in international law.
Yet it is well known that the Israeli government does not recognize
the status of the Palestinians as a national entity. The consistent Zionist-
Israeli position is reflected in the official statement of the Minister of
Information of the Government of Israel in 1969: "We do not consider
the Arabs of the land an ethnic community nor a people with a distinct
national character. ' 38 International law, as manifested by the December,
1969 Resolution of the General Assembly, has flatly rejected this position.
C. THE FUNCTION OF LEGAL STATUS IN EFFECTING PALESTINIAN
POLITICAL-LEGAL RIGHTS THROUGH THE U.N. AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The recognition of the Palestinians as a people and of the P.L.O. as
a public body, while of great importance, are not ends in themselves.
The crucial test of their long-range significance exists in the ability to
employ them in a functional manner to effectuate Palestinian rights.
1. The Recognition of the Rights of the
Palestinian People Under the U.N. Charter
The factual characteristics of the Palestinian people as a national
entity entitle them to inclusion among the peoples who are accorded rights
31 Y. SAYIGH, TowARDs PEACE IN PALESTINE (1970).
38 Supra note 3.
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as such under the U.N. Charter. Nevertheless, it is an essential step to
the practical implementation of these rights to have them specifically
and officially recognized by the U.N. rather than rely upon their recognition
by implication from the provisions of the Charter.
On December 8, 1970, the General Assembly of the U.N., by more than
the two-thirds vote required for important questions, decided that the
people of Palestine are entitled to self-determination:
Bearing in mind the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples enshrined in Articles I and 55 of the Charter of the United
Nations and more recently reaffirmed in the Declarations on Prin-
ciples of International Law Concerning Friendly Nations and Co-
operation Among Nations, (the General Assembly of the United
Nations)
Recognizes that the people of Palestine are entitled to equal rights
and self-determination in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations. 39
Thus it is clear that among the rights of the Palestinians is the right to
self-determination. Specialists in international legal theory may produce
arguments as to whether resolutions of the General Assembly are inter-
national law in themselves or merely evidence of a world community con-
census as to the existence of international law. But whichever argument
is accepted, it is evident that the Palestinian people now have the legal right
to their national state.
It is a well established principle in international law that a successful
revolution becomes a legal revolution. It is quite significant that the U.N.
General Assembly has decided that even some revolutions which are
as of yet unwon are legal revolutions because of their consistency with
the basic principles of the U.N. On December 6, 1971 the General As-
sembly, by more than two-thirds majority (and against the continual op-
position of the governments of Israel and the United States) decided that it
Confirms the legality of the peoples' struggle for self-determination
and liberation from colonial and foreign domination and alien sub-
jugation, notably in southern Africa and in particular that of the
peoples of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea,
as well as the Palestinian people, by all means consistent with the
Charter of the United Nations;
Affirms man's basic human right to fight for self-determination
of his people under colonial and foreign domination;
Calls upon all States dedicated to the ideals of freedom and peace to
give all their political, moral and material assistance to peoples
struggling for liberation, self-determination and independence against
colonial and alien domination. 40
39 G.A. RES. 2672 C. (1970). The Palestinian right to self-determination, along with that
of the peoples of southern Africa, was mentioned, in connection with the condemnation
of those governments which deny the right, in G.A. REs. 2649 (Nov. 30, 1970).
40 G.A. REs. 2787 (1971).
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The Palestinian people's resistance and "struggle for self-determination
and liberation," and that of its representative organ, the P.L.O., is thus
accorded a status in international law. In addition, their right to self-
determination is declared to be a "basic human ight." This right may be
most constructively interpreted as embracing a wide variety of methods
including the implementation of Palestinian rights through political-legal
techniques. It is significant that the resolution calls upon those states which
are committed to the ideals of freedom and peace to provide both moral
and material assistance. Consequently, such assistance may not be in-
terpreted as illegal acts of intervention.
These resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly provide the recog-
nition of the rights of the Palestinian people and the basis in international
legal authority for the Palestinians themselves and other concerned
members of the world community to take steps toward their implementation.
A workable conception of international law requires not only the for-
mulation of legal principles based upon justice, but also their effectuation.
In this respect, international law operates very much in the same way that
an individual operates in taking steps from ideas to words and then to
actions. The words set forth in international legal principles will remain
as vacuous and as misleading as Nixon's pre-1968 political rhetoric unless
they are recognized as applicable to particular entities and then practically
implemented through specific enforcement and sanctions. Yet, whether or
not effective sanctioning processes can be applied to achieve the recognized
rights of the Palestinian people through peaceful means based upon justice
under international law is another question. The impending Geneva Peace
Conference may render this justice to the Palestinian people, but not
unless they are represented by the P.L.O. as a principal to any negotiations
or treaties.
But if this justice does not come to the Palestinian people, whose tragic
plight has already challenged the integrity and credibility of the United
Nations and the legal principles which its Charter embodies, not only will
there be oil shortages, but also continual bloodbaths, arising from recurrent
instances of terror and violence, will befall Israel and its sympathetic
allies in the world community.
STEFAN TOLIN
The Civil Commitment Process
The Practising Law Institute has published a handbook entitled
Legal Rights of the Mentally Handicapped.' The work, as stated in its
foreword, strives to organize the most significant written materials avail-
B. J. ENNIS & P. R. FRIEDMAN, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED
(Criminal Law and Urban Problems No. 57, 1973).
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